A widespread security claim of the Bitcoin system, presented in the original Bitcoin white-paper, states that the security of the system is guaranteed as long as there is no attacker in possession of half or more of the total computational power used to maintain the system. This claim, however, is proved based on theoretically flawed assumptions.
The Block Discarding Attack
The attack is based on (or can be much amplified by) the assumption that the attacker can achieve "Network Superiority" by maintaining many direct network connections, much above the average of a single user. As explained in the previous section, when two blocks are released around the same time, the one that will be propagated faster has much higher chance to be eventually confirmed. The ability to make one's block be propagated much faster is part of what we regard as network superiority, while the other part is the ability to become instantly aware of any new released block in the network.
Propagation of blocks is relatively slow -the average time it takes for a node to be informed of a new block is 12.6 seconds[1] -since propagation delay composes both of the data transmissions time and the blocks verification time (a node verifies each block before it propagates it to its neighbors). Therefore, an attacker that maintains many slave nodes all across the network that are programmed to propagate her blocks without verification and to send her new received blocks without verification, is most definitely expected to acquire network superiority. That is, as long as the network is homogeneous, as the distributed Bitcoin network is ideally supposed to be. Propagation of the attacker's block can be accelerated even further by composing empty or relatively short blocks, whose verification (by the non-slave nodes) is faster.
Let's assume an attacker with 0 < p < 1 2 fraction of the total hash power achieves total network superiority, meaning she 1 is instantly informed of any new released block and her generated blocks always win the race when they are released at the same time as a competitive block. Then the attacker will lose nothing by secretly holding each new generated block until a competitor is found and then release it immediately, and while holding the block treating it like it was already accepted into the chain, i.e. mining the next block on top of the temporary-secret block.
Normally, when the attacker generates x blocks and the rest of the network generates y blocks, and each one of the blocks is mined on top of the previous generated one, the chain eventually grows by x + y more blocks. However in time of attack, if the attacker generates x blocks and the rest y blocks, then all of the attacker's blocks will eventually get into the chain while only y − x of the other blocks will get into the chain, so the chain eventually grows by only y more blocks:
Each block of the attacker is released when another block is found and hence it is used to "replace" the competitive block within the chain. So if the attacker mines x blocks, x blocks of the rest of the network will be discarded, and replaced by the attacker's blocks. The total block-chain growing rate will be as if the attacker doesn't mine at all, that is 1 − p times the normal rate.
Difficulty adjustment then lowers the difficulty so there will be approximately the same number of generated blocks within the same period of time. The total share of the attacker's blocks out of the block-chain is then raised from p to p 1−p , raising the attacker's profits.
Lows of economy dictate that the cost of hash-power invested into mining should be around the expected reward. The expected reward of the non-attacker miners is now only 1−2p 1−p times than before, so the total hash-power of the honest miners is about to decline as more miners leave the system. By essence that means the attacker's share of the total hash-power is about to exceed p, so that the attack becomes more efficient and hence there are more miners to leave the system. . . the process can halt on some equilibrium or continue until all honest miners leave.
In real-world though, the retirement of miners is expected to be less significant, since the cost of mining is divided between the cost of electricity and network connection, and the cost of dedicated ASIC machinery. Leaving the system can immediately stop the wastage of electricity, while regaining the (rel-atively high) cost of ASIC on times there are less buyers and more sellers is not trivial. Assuming the attacker isn't generously willing to buy the unwanted ASICs, honest miners might nevertheless continue to mine.
Hence the paper is more focused on the reasonability of each attack (meaning, whether it is profitable or not) rather than the exact theoretical long term outcome of a reasonable attack. Yet our theoretical equilibrium analysis is of real-world importance: it is applicable to crypto-currencies that are based on more economically liquid means of computation such as Litecoin, or SHA-256 based smaller crypto-currencies, in which an honest miner can just switch to Bitcoin in case of attack.
To analyze the possible equilibrium, let b be the hash-power of the attacker, g the initial hash-power of the honest network, and h > 0 the new hash-power of the honest network when a possible equilibrium is reached. For simplicity let the hash-power unit we use be such that b + g = 1, or equivalently, b = p.
The expected number of (eventually accepted) mined blocks per hash-power unit of an honest miner in the equilibrium state is the same as what the expected number of mined blocks per hash-power unit was before the attack. Since the total hash-power of confirmed blocks in the equilibrium state is h, we get
That means the fraction of the attacker out of the new total hash-power is
4 of the initial hah-power has left; attacker has acquired a fraction of 1 3 of the new hash-power and gets twice as much revenue as before; and the difficulty is half than before. For 0 < p < 1 4 , both the attacker gain more rewards and the mining is easier than before with the same factor, which is less than twice, and retirement is less than 1 4 of the initial power. For p > 1 4 the equilibrium is obviously impossible, meaning the process will not halt until all honest miners leave the network.
In practice, total network superiority can never be achieved. Therefore our analysis should be based upon both the attacker's fraction of total initial hashpower 0 < p < 1 2 , and her network superiority measure 0 < ns < 1, defined as follows: when an honest miner mines a new block and the attacker is quickly informed of it and tries to release a competitive block as fast as she can, ns is the probability of the event that the next block mined by the honest network on top of either of the competitive blocks, will be on top of the attacker's block. We should stress that it is irrelevant to this event whether the attacker succeeds to secretly mine yet another block before the honest network does so.
Interestingly, the attack is reasonable even were ns is explicitly lower than 1, and yet more surprisingly even were ns = 0, as long as p > 3 . However the analysis is more complex since there are many Block Discarding Attack strategies, and for different pairs of p and ns a different strategy is best suited. The strategy we have just presented is called st ∞ , and is part of a hierarchical family of strategies analyzed in subsection 3.1; in subsections 3.2 and 3.3 we present some improvements to the strategies of subsection 3.1; in subsection 3.4 we examine the applicability of the Block Discarding Attack to non-Bitcoin crypto-currencies designs; finally we suggest a simple countermeasure to all possible Block Discarding Attack strategies on subsection 3.5.
The st k family of strategies
Under the following three assumptions, all reasonable less than 50% of hashpower Block Discarding mining strategies are shown to be just the st k , k = 0, 1, 2, .., ∞ family, defined in algorithm 1:
1. While the attacker's strategy might affect the mining difficulty, it affects the attacker and the honest parties the same way.
2. The strategy is not based on any information but the current block-chain branches.
3. The attacker never tries to extend a branch if there is a (strictly) longer branch.
Since the attacker has less than half of the total hash-power, it follows from assumption 1 that on any possible mining strategy, eventually will come a moment where a new honest block is published and the attacker has no competitive block to release. Then the attacker is forced to switch to the honest block, according to assumption 3.
We shall call such a moment "consensus". Using this term we can say that a Block-Discarding strategy is a set of rules the attacker follows, beginning on consensus, until the next consensus is achieved. The aim of such strategy is to increase the fraction of the attacker confirmed blocks out of all confirmed blocks, and its means are decision as for releasing or holding a block, and choosing on top of which block to try mining the next.
All strategies that fork the chain into more than two branches (meaning, the attacker is simultaneously extending at least two different branches), or that are not deterministic given the current state of branches, can be shown to be not optimal. Thus in any reasonable strategy there are always up to two competitive public branches of the same length, one is composed solely of the attacker's block and the other solely of honest blocks, where the public attacker's branch might have a secret extension.
Not mining on top of the attacker own branch is never reasonable; releasing a secret block when the honest branch gets extended can never harm the attacker; and releasing more blocks than needed for the attacker's public branch to surpass the honest branch by a single block, is never wise. Therefore, a reasonable strategy is just a rule as for the circumstances on which to release just the single block needed to make the two public branches even again, and the circumstances in which it is better to release a block so that the attacker's public branch surpasses the honest branch, and thus ensure the attacker's branch is eventually confirmed.
While attacker with total network superiority has nothing to lose from secretly holding each of her blocks until a competitive is found, attacker without release your earliest unpublished block . public f ork length ← public f ork length + 1 .
if the honest block is mined on top of attacker's block .
public f ork length = 1 .
if gap = 1 and public f ork length ≥ k . releas your secret block . go to consensus . else .
continue to mine on top of the same block total superiority takes a risk whenever she has only a single secret block ahead of her public branch and there is a competitive equally long honest branch:
In case the honest network mines the next block before the attacker and it is mined on top of the attacker's public branch, her branch gets confirmed and there are then just two competitive single-block new branches. On the other hand, if this honest block is mined on top of the honest branch (the probability of that is 1 − ns > 0), the attacker releases her last secret block and the next block too happens to be an honest block extending the honest branch, she loses her whole branch.
The st k strategy differs from the strategy of attacker with total network superiority only in the event that the attacker has a single secret block and the length of the public branches is of k or more blocks. On this event, the st k attacker would release her secret block, obtaining a new consensus. Thus we can view the strategy of the total network superior attacker as st ∞ , and st 0 as the honest mining strategy. We shall start by analyzing the profitability of the st 1 strategy, which is of crucial importance: as we latter prove, attacker has some better strategy than st 0 iff st 1 is better than st 0 .
We denote by ar k and hr k the corresponding average rewards the attacker and the honest network accept, where the attacker uses the st k strategy (and the honest network use st 0 ). The reward is measured as the miner's number of eventually confirmed blocks between two consecutive consensuses. We denote by e k the probability to obtain between two consecutive consensuses, a situation where the attacker holds a single secret block and the two public branches are of exactly k blocks each, assuming the attacker uses st k . Obviously, ar k hr k and e k are functions of p and ns.
Claim 1:
2. The st 1 attacker resulted fraction of the total rewards is
4. The resulted mining difficulty of the st 1 attack is adjusted to be
times the previous difficulty. Note: we don't assume the retirement of honest miners, which could theoretically lead to a further decreased difficulty.
Corollary: No matter how fast is the information propagation between honest nodes of a Bitcoin network compared to the attacker's nodes, attacker with more than 1 3 of the total hash-power would nevertheless have a reasonable strategy, even if her network superiority is zero.
Proof: Beginning in a consensus, the process in which the next consensus is reached where the attacker uses the st 1 strategy, can either start by two consecutive blocks the attacker mines before all others, or is one of four possible paths:
1. The first block to be mined is honest, and then the new consensus is reached.
2. First mined block is of the attacker, the second is honest and the third is of the attacker too. When this block is mined the attacker releases it immediately and the new consensus is reached.
3. First is the attacker block, second is an honest block, and the third block is an honest block mined on top of the previous honest block. When this block is mined the 2-blocks honest branch leads to the next consensus.
4. First is the attacker's block, second is an honest block, and third is yet another honest block which is mined on top of the attacker's block. The branch of the first and third blocks then leads to the next consensus.
The corresponding probabilities of the four special cases are:
The corresponding rewards of the attacker are: 0, 2, 0, 1 and of the honest network are: 1, 0, 2, 1.
As for a process starting by two consecutive attacker's blocks, it will end as soon as the honest network minimizes the 2-blocks gap to a single-block gap. The rewards outcome depends only on the number of steps until this gap is closed, while it doesn't matter whether an honest block is mined on top of a previous honest block or on top of the last block the attacker released.
The expectancy of the number of binomial random walking moves until we first get to the point which is one step to the right, where moving left probability is p < 1 2 , is known to be 1 1−2p , including the last step to the right. Thus the average number of steps to the left until that point, is half of the total number of steps until that point not counting the last one, that is, (
Thus the average rewards the attacker is about to get when the process begins with two consecutive blocks of her own is
The probability of that is p 2 , hence we get:
. Therefore the attacker resulted fraction of the total rewards is
. As for the difficulty adjustment, the decreasing factor is the ratio of the average number of chain blocks between two consecutive consensuses and the average total number of valid blocks mined between two consensuses, including all eventually dumped blocks.
The average number of chain blocks is obviously ar 1 + hr 1 , while the average total number of mined blocks is 1 1−p times the average total number of honest mined blocks. The number of chain blocks between two consecutive consensuses is the total number of honest mined blocks or this number plus one, in case the attacker is the composer of the new consensus block. The probability of the latter case is p 2 (2 − p), hence ar 1 + hr 1 − p 2 (2 − p) is the average total number of honest blocks. [end of proof] Claim 2: Let k ∈ N ∪ {0}.
and
2. If st k+2 is more profitable than st k+1 then st k+1 is more profitable than st k .
3. There is a reasonable Block Discarding Attack strategy if and only if p > 1−ns 3−2ns , under assumptions 1,2,3. Proof: The st k+1 strategy differs from st k only in case a situation is obtained where both public attacker's branch and the honest branch are of exactly k blocks and the attacker holds a single secret block on top of her public branch. The probability that between two consecutive consensuses this situation occurs, while playing according to st k , is denoted by e k . Hence ar k+1 -ar k is of the form e k (A − (k + 1)) where A is the average reward the st k+1 attacker gets starting in the described situation and until a new consensus is achieved.
A is calculated much like ar 1 . In fact, this process is equivalent to the process that starts with a situation where the attacker have a single secret block on top of consensus and ends with the next consensus, where the attacker plays according to st 1 , with a simple twist: in case the attacker's first block is eventually confirmed, she is extra rewarded with k more blocks.
When the st 1 attacker starts with a single secret block and no public blocks, the probability that eventually this block is excluded is (1 − p) 2 (1 − ns), since this can only happen where the next two mined blocks are honest blocks and the second is on top of the first. Thus we get A =
2 (1 − ns)), as claimed. As for hr k+1 , it is similarly calculated: hr k+1 − hr k = e k · H where H is the average reward the honest network gets from the twisted st 1 -similar process.
A strategy st m+1 is more profitable than st m iff arm hrm < arm+1 hrm+1 , or equivalently
. The sequence arm+1−arm hrm+1−hrm m decreases until all of its elements are negative, so if st k+2 is more profitable than st k+1 , meaning
, then
, meaning st k+1 is more profitable than st k . As a consequence there is a reasonable attack, meaning a strategy that is better than st 0 , iff st 1 is better than st 0 . We already know this is equivalent to p > 1−ns 3−2ns . [end of proof] The above proof shows us how to calculate the best result attacker with certain 0 < p < 1 2 and 0 ≤ ns < 1 can achieve using one of the st k strategies: we can recursively calculate the expected rewards of st k , simply by calculating e k and using the formulas for ar k+1 and hr k+1 . The first k whose consecutive is yielding a smaller reward is the best option. If k is 0 or 1 only, there are finitely many ways to obtain the described event whose probability is e k , hence e k can be calculated simply by summing the corresponding probabilities. For calculating e k for k ≥ 2, one can use basic theory of Markov processes.
In case p and ns are such that the best strategy is of relatively high k, the difference between st k and st ∞ might be insignificant, as e k is negligibly small. Thus, although the st ∞ is never optimal for ns < 1, we shall nevertheless use the following claim as estimation for the st k outcome of relatively high k.
Claim 3: The st ∞ attacker expected fraction of the total rewards is -
Proof: In the st ∞ strategy, the resulted block-chain contains exactly the same number of blocks as the number of valid mined honest blocks. However the chain is only partially composed of those blocks, since some of them are "replaced" by the attacker. Hence the desired fraction is the ratio between the number of the attacker mined blocks that are eventually included in the chain and the total number of honest mined blocks, either eventually included or excluded. Equivalently, that is p 1−p times the probability of an attacker mined block to get accepted.
We prove the claim by showing that a fraction of
out of the total attacker mined blocks are eventually excluded. This fraction is the ratio between the average number of excluded attacker blocks between two consecutive consensuses to, and the average total number of blocks the attacker succeeds to mine between two consecutive consensuses. Out of the same random-walking reasons presented in the proof of claim 1, the average total number of attacker's block between two consensuses is p 1−2p . The average number of excluded blocks is a bit more complex to compute: the probability that the honest network will surpass the attacker when she has exactly k mined blocks since the last consensus is
is the kth Catalan number. When this happens, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the ith attacker's block is excluded iff all the k + 1 − i honest blocks that were mined after the ith block was publish, were not mined on top of the attacker's public branch. Thus the average of excluded blocks in this case is
, we get
, So the fraction of excluded blocks out of all the attacker's mined blocks is 
The sst k family of strategies
Although assumption 2 of the previous subsection seems to be very reasonable at first sight, the network does supplies the attacker with external to the blockchain important information that might help her make more justified decisions as for holding or publishing blocks.
When the attacker tries to discard a new published honest block, just after the two competitive blocks are propagated and before any new block is mined, the honest miners are divided into those who mine on top of the honest block and those who mine on top of the attacker's block. On average, the hash-power of the second part is a fraction of ns out of the total honest hash power.
However, the sophisticated attacker can use slave nodes to estimate the current fraction of the honest network that accepts her last released block, and act accordingly: while the st k attacker always releases her secret block whenever there is a single such block and the public branches are of k blocks, the sophisticated attacker may nevertheless holds the secret block if the current winning probability happens to be significantly higher than ns. On the other hand, when the sophisticated attacker is left with a single secret block and public branches are shorter than k blocks, she may nevertheless release it if the winning probability happens to be small.
The author suspects that the posterior wining probabilities tend to be either very close to 1 or 0, due to the exponential nature of the block propagation process in the Bitcoin network [1] . Obviously, the distribution of posterior winning probabilities where values are either 1 or 0, which is equivalent to the possibility to know in advance whether a block is going to win or lose, is the best distribution for the attacker. The distribution where winning probability is constantly ns, on the other hand, is the worst. Unfortunately we don't know the actual distribution, which is strongly dependent on the real-world network topology, and trying to measure it is very expensive. Hence the attacker best possible outcome should be upper and lower bounded.
The best st k strategy is in fact the best sophisticated strategy in the case of constant winning probabilities, thus it provides us a lower bound. As for the upper bound, we define the sst k family of sophisticated strategies, which can be shown to be the only reasonable strategies for the 1/0 binary distribution.
The sst k strategy differs from st k only in the situation where the attacker was left with a single secret block and the public branches are of at least k blocks: while the st k attacker always releases her last block, the sst k attacker does so only when she is about to lose, and with probability of ns keeps holding the secret block.
We note that sst 0 and sst ∞ are correspondingly identical to st 0 and st ∞ ; claim 2 has a similar version about the sst k family; the sst 1 attacker fraction of total rewards is (1−p·ns) ; and the attacker has a reasonable strategy iff p > 1−ns 3−2ns , meaning there is no profitable sophisticated strategy if there is no regular profitable strategy.
The last claim can be intuitively explained by noticing that for a pair of p and ns such that st 1 is of the same profitability as st 0 (and sst 0 ), sst 1 is also of the same profitability: when the sst 1 attacker holds her last secret block despite having a non-empty public branch, in case she know her branch is going to win the competitor branch, we may regard the situation as having a single secret block on top of consensus. Hence the only difference between the st 1 and the sst 1 attacker is in a sense that in some of the cases the latter keeps a single block on top of consensus in secret, the former choose to publish it. However publishing a single block on top of a consensus is of the same expected profits as holding it secret, so the sst 1 attacker achieve the same profitability nevertheless.
Possible countermeasures
Considering countermeasures to the described attacks, a natural direction is to change the process of propagating new mined blocks so that attacker will be less likely to achieve network superiority above 1 2 . More specifically, we may ask the Bitcoin users to maintain a list of all received maximal-length branches and deliver new received blocks to all of their neighbors. Moreover, we may ask miners to randomly choose on top of which branch to try mining the next block, and ignore the order in which they were received.
This natural direction has two major problems: first, it does not change the core of the Bitcoin protocol, but rather suggests a non-obligatory new configuration of end users' clients. A user may choose not to maintain a list nor deliver more than one competitive block, and nevertheless is not about to experience any resulted problem. Though the group of Bitcoin users and miners has a motive to implement such a change, the individual user has no incentive at all doing so. On the contrary: as the protocol transport volume keeps rising, users would like to minimize the delivered data. As we already know, bad incentives make real problems in the Bitcoin system [2] .
The second and more crucial problem is the essentially limited success of this direction. Due to the theoretical inability of honest miners to recognize which one of two competitive blocks is the attacker's, we can doubtfully guarantee the attacker network superiority to be less than 1 2 . Yet even attacker with zero superiority needs less than half of the total hash-power to have a reasonable attack.
Therefore we propose a different countermeasure, by tackling the block discarding attacks from a different angle. All attack strategies are based on continuously forking the block-chain into relatively short branches, hence introducing a fork-punishment rule into to core of the protocol can make those strategies unprofitable. More specifically, we suggest not rewarding the miner of a block that has a competitive block of another same-length branch, despite belonging to the winner branch. There is a variety of possible implementations of this basic idea, yet we would like to technically specify a simple possibility:
A pair of two same-length competitive branches, composed of N blocks at most, shall be called "fork evidence". A miner may include fork evidence as part of the new block she is trying to mine, as long as the origin of the fork is less than 100 blocks deep. When a fork evidence have been successfully included within a confirmed block, its lucky miner is rewarded half of the total rewards the winning branch of the fork is about to gain, excluding blocks of a sub-branch that has already been punished before, while the owners of those punished blocks will then be totally disrewarded.
It should be noted that by doing so we can set the reasonability threshold of block discarding attack to be as close to half of the hash-power as we want, by choosing big enough N, yet in practice we see no reason to choose N which is greater than 10. There are two disadvantages of the proposed change: the current 100-blocks delay of the mining rewards, could not be abolished or get shortened as it can be now, and the variance of mining profits [3] would slightly increase.
The reason for not delivering all of the punished blocks rewards to the miner who supplies the fork-evidence, is to prevent the profitability of intentionally mining on top of previous blocks in order to get the old rewards into possession. An even further restriction, such as maximum reward for supplying fork-evidence, is needed if fees can make some of the rewards twice as big as the average reward. The author is not concerned by the limited abolishment of money this proposal is about to cause, yet there are possible mechanisms to spread the total rewards of the punished blocks over many miners.
The Difficulty Raising Attack
On this section we show that the fundamental security claim of Bitcoin, presented on the original paper of S. Nakamoto [4] based on binomial random walk, is theoretically inaccurate. As explained on section 2, assuming difficulty and hash-power ownerships are constant, the probability that an attacker in possession of 0 < p < 1 times the hash-power of the other network will be able to discard a block that has been extended by n sequential blocks is p n . Please notice that on this section we regard p as the ratio between the hash-powers of the attacker and the honest network, rather than the fraction of the attacker's hash-power out of the total hash-power.
However difficulty is not constant, and can be manipulated by the attacker. The Difficulty Raising Attack enables the attacker to discard n-depth block, for any n and any positive p, with probability 1 if she is willing to wait enough time.
On contrast with the Block Discarding Attack, on this second attack the attacker is trying to calculate a completely competitive block-chain whose blocks are uncorrelated to the honest network's blocks. The two requirements each valid block must satisfy presented on section 2, will sure be fulfilled if each block timestamp precedes its previous block timestamp and the time stamp of the last block of the chain will be earlier than the real time at the point of the release.
The simplified attack
In order to demonstrate the basic idea of the difficulty raising, let's make a relaxation of the adjustment mechanism: we say the difficulty of a window is different from the difficulty of the previous window by a factor of exactly the ratio between two weeks and the timespan of the previous window, also when this ratio is more than 4:1 or less than 1:4.
The (simplified) attack is launched when a new window begins. The first block of that window is going to be the last common block of the honest network chain and the attacker's chain: the attacker secretly calculates 2014 blocks on top of this first block of the window, each block's timestamp is chosen to be one second ahead of its predecessor. An even better possibility is to declare all times as being exactly the same as the first block of the window -this is possible, according to section 2.
Let the attacker hash-power be 0 < p < 1 times the power of the honest network. The attacker is going to keep try mining two blocks -the last of the current window and the first of the consecutive window -such that the difficulties sum of the faked branch will exceeds that of the honest network. When she fails, she tries to mine another couple of blocks on top of the last of the 2014 blocks. The timestamp of the first block in the couple is chosen so that the second block will have the desired difficulty.
Using the difficulty of the first window as our difficulty unit and 10 minutes as our time unit, on time t since the attack the total honest block difficulties sum is about t, hence the attacker needs to choose the difficulty d of the second window such that 2015 + d > t.
As time proceeds, d becomes much greater than 1, so the expected time needed for mining the first block is negligible compared to the second. When the attacker takes a new trial she choose an interval ∆ that is much bigger than 1 p , which is the expected time of calculating the first block, and set d to be such that if she manages to mine her two blocks during the interval time, her block-chain is about to surpass the one of the honest network. Her chances of succeeding are about ∆·p t−2015 . The integral´d x x diverges to infinity, so if the attacker continues with the strategy long enough, eventually she will win and be able to double-spend. Interestingly, although the probability of success is 1, the mean time it takes is infinity. However the median time is finite and can be approximated by √ e 2015 p units of 10 minutes for small values of p.
Since the attack might take a very long time, our assumption that the sum of difficulties of the honest block-chain on time t is about t, needs to be reconsidered. As time proceeds it is reasonable to assume the technology of computation improves. If both the honest network and the attack hash-power have been increased by the same factor, meaning p hasn't changed, the attack would actually be easier: the necessary ratio between the current difficulty of the honest network and the artificially chosen difficulty d of the attack is 1 : t where the honest network difficulty remains constant, but higher otherwise. In fact, if hash-power exponentially rises with time, this necessary ratio -and hence the success prob-ability of each interval -approaches a positive constant as t approaches infinity. Thus the attacker is about to succeed on a finite average time.
The non-simplified attack
We shall now describe the non-simplified attack, in which the difficulty can be increased by a factor of at most 4 between two consecutive windows. For simplicity, we assume that on time t since the attack, the sum of difficulties of the honest branch is exactly t. It is sound to assume the total hash-power is constant, as a proportional increment of both the attacker's and the honest miners' hash-power can only make it easier for the attacker.
Claim 4: Attacker forks the chain when a new window begins by mining a competitive block on top of the first block of the window. The declared time of each of the attacker's blocks is chosen to be 2.5 minutes ahead of its predecessor. If the attacker continues with this strategy long enough, no matter how small her hash-power is, on some point her chain will surpass the honest chain.
In order to prove the claim we use two lemmas about sums of independent exponentially distributed random variables. We denote by exp(λ) a random variable whose probability density function is λe −λx . Lemma 1: Denote P bad = Pr
. In other words, P bad is the probability of 2016 i=1 exp(λ) being more than twice its expected value. Then P bad is the same extremely small positive constant for all values of λ, and for all k ∈ N: Pr
Lemma 2: For each ǫ > 0 there is δ > 0 such that for any big enough k ∈ N the probability that
is less than ǫ times its expected value, is greater than δ.
Proof of lemma 2: Let m be sufficiently large so that for any k > m, the expected value of 
2016
3m−1 j=2m 4 j , etc. As we show next, the conditional probability of the attacker success in any interval, given the failure of the attacker to surpass the honest chain during all earlier intervals, is bigger than δ, which proves the claim. j=(k−1)·m 4 j which is exactly the length of the kth interval. When the attacker goes into another interval of time she doesn't calculate the block-chain from the beginning of the fork but continues from the point she has gone so far during the previous intervals of time, so the probability of success within a certain interval is greater than δ. [end of proof]
A natural question of theoretical importance is whether this counterintuitive attack has a possible protocol countermeasure. We believe the answer is negative: the capabilities of computational devices seem to grow exponentially with time, though the exponential base might gradually and unpredictably change over time. Thus any protocol mechanism of difficulty adjustment should enable a difficulty rising that is exponential with respect to the block-chain length.
There is a variety of adjustment mechanisms that differ from the Bitcoin mechanism by having different window lengths, different adjustment restrictions than having up to 4 times or at least as 1 4 times the previous difficulty, or even having the adjustment delayed or smoothed [5] . Yet any mechanism enabling exponentially rise of the difficulty is vulnerable to the attacker, no matter how small is the exponential base of the maximal rising.
Estimating the real-world threats
Both the Block Discarding Attack and the Difficulty Raising Attack are currently unrealistic and of theoretical importance only. However, while the mathematical calculations convincingly show there is no actual threat out of the second attack, the first attack threat is limited by the structure of the current Bitcoin network: the highest share of a solo miner out of the total hash-power, the network topology of miners and their delays when receiving and releasing blocks.
First of all it should be noted that the Block Discarding Attack is not applicable to pools, since the attack requires the secrecy of the new mined blocks, which cannot be guaranteed while they are shared with all (anonymous) pool miners. The only thing a centralized pool can do is to withhold a new block someone in the pool has found, while the other pool members keep mining on top of the older block, until a competitive block of non-pool miner has been released. Then the one or more blocks the pool has found will be released too -and hopefully win the race over the non-pool competitor.
By doing so the pool's relative share out of all mining rewards is unchanged if the pool has total network superiority, and decreased otherwise, hence the attack is unreasonable. Nevertheless the attack can be performed by a small well organized group of solo miners. In case one of the attackers happens to be a centralized pool owner, the pool might be used to amplify the attack.
The smaller is the attacker fraction of the system total hash-power, the closer to 1 is the minimal network superiority essential for a reasonable attack. Assuming all current solo miners' hash-power fractions are relatively small, the attack is enabled only if achieving almost total network superiority is possible within the real Bitcoin network, which is very questionable.
On theory, an ideally homogeneous decentralized Bitcoin network will enable attacker that maintains many slave nodes to achieve network superiority. In practice, the real network topology is definitely not homogeneous or ideally decentralized. The author believes it is possible to get quickly informed of any new published block, yet harder to immediately propagate a new block. The blockchain.info website seems to assure the first part of the claim, while trying to validate the second part is unfortunately very costly. Despite being generally considered a negative phenomenon, the gathering of small miners into major pools might positively affect the difficulty to immediately propagate new blocks: while the average time it takes for a node to be informed of a new block is said to be 12.6 seconds, the time it takes for a pool organizer, which naturally maintains many network connections, is expected to be much lower.
Assuming attacker with less than 1 4 of the total hash-power have nevertheless magically achieves total network superiority and uses the st ∞ strategy, the resulted new equilibrium can hardly be considered as a real threat to the system. This attacker will not be able to do any real harm, yet the resulted decline of the total difficulty of the chain theoretically makes the system more vulnerable to a second more powerful attacker.
On the purely theoretical scenario where the attacker deports all other miners, she can harm the system by launching a DoS attack. Double-spending attack, however, is more problematic since the moment the Block-Discarding attacker stops mining linearly, all the ex-miners will happily start mining again, and are expected to gain awesome rewards due to the lower difficulty.
Yet we believe a countermeasure should be implied. Although not very likely, it is absolutely possible that some government offended by the dark market uses of Bitcoins decides to launch a DoS attack against the system.
Related works
Related works Bitcoin attacks with less than 1 2 of the computational power are by no means new. Several attacks have been known since the early days of the system, of which one simple yet important double spending attack goes as follows: the attacker secretly mines blocks on top of the longest branch she knows. No matter how small is the attacker hash-power, eventually the time would come where the attacker secret chain is longer by 6 blocks than the honest chain. Then the attacker may send conflicting transactions to the honest and the secret branch, and publish the secret branch just before the honest branch close the gap.
As for the two attacks described in this paper, although the author comes to all the ideas and analysis presented here independently of any related work, there are some similar works. Some of them are as early as 2010, while others have been published during the last few days. The alleged coincidence can be explained by the publication of analysis regarding the flow of information in the Bitcoin network, e.g. [2] and the quite recent [2] , that inspired the blockdiscarding idea.
The Block Discarding Attack
The basic block-discarding idea, and a strategy to secretly hold new mined block, were explicitly described in 2010-old thread of Bitcoin technical discussions forum [7] including numerical results of a simplified simulation [8] . Despite the participation of influential Bitcoin developers in this forum discussion, the attack has been long forgotten, probably due to allegedly being impractical. Surprisingly, two researchers of Cornell University have recently and independently published a pre-print paper mathematically analyzing the st 1 strategy, which they call "Selfish Mining" [9] .
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Apart from presenting a more comprehensive analysis of the Block Discarding Attack and its many strategies, we suggest a different view of the attack nature: while the pre-print paper describes the attack as being done by a mining pool, and the resulted effect of the st 1 strategy is said to be a transfer of small miners from honest pools to the "selfish" pool, we stress that a Block discarding attack can only be performed by a very powerful solo miner and that the key point of the attack is the difficulty adjustment which enables the solo attacker to gain higher rewards.
Moreover, the mentioned paper claims the attack creates a process which will not end until the attacker pool oust all other miners. As we explain, the more likely outcome is a new equilibrium with fewer honest miners that maintain the same profits, as the difficulty adjustment makes mining easier. Yet another difference is about the suggested countermeasures.
The Difficulty Raising Attack
The fact that there is no way to determine whether a block have been computed on its declared time or not, which is at the base of our Difficulty Raising Attack, have been noted before in Bitcoin discussions forums and even been used as part of two attacks [11, 12] .
While concerns of [11] were limited to the possible vulnerability of network time differences, the false timestamps in [12] are used to manipulate the mining difficulty: the attack exploit the protocol bag stated in section 2, that the time span of a window is calculated from its first to its last block and not from the last block of the previous window. However, the attack requires the cooperation of more than half of the hash-power, and aimed only to increase the rewarding of miners. Inventors of the attack explicitly state their opinion regarding the impossibility of manipulate the difficulty to achieve a chain with total sum of difficulties higher than the real amount of hash-power invested to calculate the chain.
